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Abstract
We study the labor-supply e¤ects of subsidized minimum wages in a
structural household model with married and single households. In the
model, married womens hours react relatively strongly to minimum
wages due to substitution e¤ects within the home production of couples
while other population groups show ambiguous reactions. An empirical
analysis for Germany shows that minimum wages would a¤ect total
labor supply only weakly while, in our baseline experiments, married
womens average hours increase by 3-6%. Further, we nd that costs of
a subsidized minimum wage are high and increase sharply in its level
while its labor-supply e¤ects level out.
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1 Introduction
In Germany, there is a vivid political debate on introducing a general statutory
minimum wage. Trade unions, leading political parties, and a majority of
society approve the idea in one or the other form. One suggestion is to introduce
minimum wages in the form of a wage subsidy with the government paying
the di¤erence between a recipients gross wage and the minimum wage, leaving
labor costs to the employer unchanged (referred to as "Kombilohn"). Suggested
levels for a general minimum wage in Germany lie in the range of e 7.50 to e
9.50 per hour.
The academic profession studies extensively the economic e¤ects of min-
imum wages. Thereby, it mainly concentrates on labor demand and usually
nds rather small e¤ects empirically.1 By contrast, e¤ects on labor supply are
typically paid less attention to. This focus seems justied as labor is typically
thought to be supplied rather inelastically at a full-time basis. In fact, esti-
mated labor-supply elasticities are typically small for men, see Keane (2011)
and Keane and Rogerson (2012). However, empirically, low wages are predom-
inantly an issue for women and particularly for married women. In Germany,
about two thirds of potential recipients of a minimum wage are women and
two thirds of these women are married.2
It is well known in the literature that women di¤er substantially from men
in terms of labor-supply behavior. Indeed, several particularities of female
labor supply suggest that womens labor supply may react di¤erently to the
introduction of minimum wages than the labor supply of men:
 While men, if employed, mostly work full time, women show a much
higher part-time rate.
 Many studies have reported much higher labor-supply elasticities for
women than for men.3 This nding holds in particular for women em-
ployed in low-skill sectors (Keane and Wolpin 2010).
 Next to wages, household production and child care have been shown to
be important for womens labor supply (Becker 1974; Jones et al. 2003;
Greenwood et al. 2005).
 For married women, characteristics of the husband are almost as impor-
tant as their own ones (Devereux 2004; Blau and Kahn 2007) implying
1See e.g. Machin and Manning (1997) and Dickens et al. (1999) for the UK, Neumark
and Wascher (2007) and Dube et al. (2010) for the US, and König and Möller (2009) and
Frings (2012) for Germany.
2This nding is not specic to Germany. For instance, Dolado et al. (1996) document for
France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK that the majority of minimum-wage recipients
are female.
3See Cogan (1981), Eckstein andWolpin (1989), Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), van der
Klaauw (1996), Francesconi (2002), Chang and Kim (2006), Evers et al. (2008).
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that marriage patterns are important to understand the distribution of
female labor supply (Bredemeier and Juessen 2012).
In this paper, we develop a structural model of labor supply that takes into
account these particularities of female labor supply and use it to study the
e¤ects of a general statutory minimum wage in Germany. In this model, we
introduce a minimum wage as a comparative-static policy experiment. Speci-
cally, we consider a minimum wage that is introduced as an e¤ective wage sub-
sidy not a¤ecting the gross hourly wage paid by the employer ("Kombilohn",
similar to earned income tax credits in the US).
In the model, we distinguish between single and couple households and we
take into account home production. In this set-up, individuals face di¤erent
margins of adjustment in response to the introduction of the minimum wage
and, accordingly, the labor-supply e¤ects of the policy di¤er between household
types. In one-person households in the low-wage sector, the minimum wage
induces substitution between consumption of the home-produced commodity
and market-purchased goods. Thus, the labor-supply e¤ect is determined by
the elasticity of substitution between these two commodities. This elasticity
is small under standard calibrations. By contrast, in two-person households
(married couples), intra-household specialization is an important determinant
of labor supply and minimum wages a¤ect female labor supply on two margins.
In addition to the standard substitution e¤ect in consumption, there are also
substitution e¤ects in home production. As the minimum wage increases pre-
dominantly net wages of women, the degree of intra-household specialization
declines and market labor supply of married women increases. Thus, while
singles react only slightly to the introduction of the minimum wage, our model
analysis shows that the e¤ect is stronger for women who live in a couple house-
hold.
In the quantitative part of the paper, we apply the model to the German
labor market using data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP). We
rst estimate the parameters of the structural model using micro data and il-
lustrate that the estimated model ts well the empirical observed distribution
of hours worked by population subgroups. In particular, we show that the esti-
mated model explains well the labor-supply behavior of potential recipients of
a minimum wage. We then use the estimated model to perform policy experi-
ments with respect to the introduction of a minimum wage subsidy. Thereby,
we distinguish between di¤erent levels and designs of the minimum wage and
between di¤erent ways of nancing it.
In these policy experiments, we nd that overall labor supply changes after
the introduction of a minimum wage are small. Under our baseline speci-
cations of the policy, overall labor-supply e¤ects are about 1.5-2%. However,
certain population groups are a¤ected more substantially, i.e. the composition
of labor supply changes. The group of married women as a whole is predicted
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to increase labor supply by about 3-6%, depending on the level of the minimum
wage. The subgroup of married women with initial wages below the minimum
wage (thus, those married women who receive the minimum wage) respond
to the policy with strong increases in labor supply. Depending on the level
of the minimum wage, this subgroup increases hours worked by up to 28%,
corresponding to a labor-supply elasticity of 0.94 for this subgroup.
In contrast to married women, other population groups respond rather
weakly to the wage subsidy. Single women increase their average labor supply
by at most 2% and single men by about 1%. Married men show the weakest
response of all population groups and increase hours by less than 0.5%.
Our structural modelling approach also allows us to evaluate the costs of
the subsidy for di¤erent suggested levels of the minimum wage. We nd that
subsidized minimum wages are relatively expensive to the public budget and
that these costs increase strongly in the level of the minimum wage while their
e¤ects on labor supply increase rather weakly. For instance, a subsidy leading
to a minimum wage of e 7.50 gross per hour would cost about e 6 per head and
week which corresponds to a 1.5% decrease in net hourly wages if nanced by a
proportional labor-income tax. By contrast, a tax increase equivalent to more
than 8.5% reduction in net wages would be necessary to nance a generous
minimum wage of e 8.50 net per hour. Despite this sharp di¤erence in costs,
the labor supply reaction is only 2 percentage points stronger under the more
generous minimum wage policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In Section 3, we analyze a simplied version of the model analytically
to highlight the di¤erential impact of minimum wages on single and couple
households. In Section 4, we estimate the parameters of the full model using
German micro data and perform several policy experiments using the estimated
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is populated by agents who are heterogeneous with respect to
wage rates, gender, marital status, age, and number of children. When an
individual lives alone, i.e. in a one-person household, she takes her decisions
individually. By contrast, couples consist of a woman and a man and decisions
are taken jointly by both household members.
Preferences and technology. There are two commodities in the model, a
market consumption good and a home consumption good. Individualspref-
erences over the two commodities are characterized by the utility function ui,
where i indexes an individual and
ui =

  c
1 1
1
i +  i  d
2 1
2
i
 3
3 1
: (1)
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ci denotes consumption of the market good and di stands for consumption of
the home good. The market good is allowed to have a public-good component
(see below). The home good is perfectly public to a household.  and  i are
the respective utility weights on the two commodities.  is a constant, while
agentsutility weight for home consumption,  i, is generally allowed to di¤er
across agents. Following e.g. Chiappori et al. (2002), Bonin et al. (2002), and
van Klaveren et al. (2008),  i is assumed to be a function of the number of
children, ki, and years of age, bi
 i =  0 +   ki + 1  bi + 2  b2i , (2)
where  determines the e¤ect of children on the valuation for home consump-
tion. The parameters 1 and 2 control the life-cycle prole of the valuation
of home consumption and therefore indirectly the life-cycle prole of hours
worked.
The home technology uses home labor h and is of the constant elasticity of
substitution type,
dj =
"X
i2J
(i  hi)
h 1
h
# 1 h
h
, (3)
where j indexes the household and J is the set of household js members.
i and h are exogenous parameters measuring the agents home productivity
and the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent household memberstime in
home production, respectively. The home production function (3) implies that
singles produce the home good with linear technology, di = i  hi; as there is
only one household member. For couples, the CES specication (3) nests both
linear and Cobb-Douglas technology.
Agents have a xed time endowment T which can be used for market work
and home production, i.e.4
ni + hi = T . (4)
Market goods can be earned through market labor ni while home goods
have to be produced at home using the agents time in home producton hi. A
households budget constraint in terms of the market good reads as
cj =
X
i2J
wini   tj, (5)
with
wi = (1  i) ai:
4We abstract from leisure as, in the cross-section, it is home production time that is most
closely tied to market work while leisure time is rather constant across agents, see Freeman
and Schettkat (2005). Thus, in a realistic calibration, leisure would not substantially interact
with other time uses.
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wi denotes the individuals e¤ective net hourly wage and is determined by
the individuals tax rate i and her exogenously given gross wage rate ai. The
household further pays a lump-sum tax tj. cj denotes the amount of the market
consumption good purchased by the household. In a single household, this ob-
viously equals the individuals consumption. In a couple household, individual
consumption depends on how members share consumption and the public-good
component of market goods, see equation (6) below.
Household decision making. A single i takes her decisions individually.
She maximizes utility (1) subject to the home production constraint (3), the
time constraint (4), and the budget constraint (5) taking the net wage wi, home
productivity i, age bi, and the number of children ki as given.
By contrast, in the couple household, decisions are taken collectively (Chi-
appori 1988). The household determines the e¢ cient allocation of household
resources taking both spousesnet wages, home productivities, ages, and the
number of children as given. In line with theoretical arguments (Browning
et al. 1994; Browning et al. 2006; Knowles 2007) and empirical evidence (van
Klaveren et al. 2008; Lise and Seitz 2011), we assume that consumption shares
are a function of relative wages,
ci
cj
=

wi
wi + w i

. (6)
The market good is allowed to have a public-good component as measured by
. If  < 1, household members enjoy part of the households consumption
purchases jointly, i.e. the sum of their individual consumption exceeds the
households expenditures for consumption. If  = 0, the market good is com-
pletely public to a household, implying ci = cj: As the home good is completely
public, we have di = dj.
Government. The minimum wage is implemented through negative tax
rates for applicable individuals, i.e. as a wage subsidy. If a minimum wage
wmin is implemented, the government sets i = 1   wminai < 0 for those indi-
viduals with gross wages below the minimum wage, ai < wmin. We consider
di¤erent scenarios for nancing the minimum-wage policy. The government
may either use lump-sum taxes tj or distortionary labor-income taxes i on in-
dividuals with higher gross wages than the minimum wage. The governments
budget reads as Z
iainidi+
Z
tjdj = 0.
Labor demand. In our model, labor demand determines the distribution of
individualsgross wages ai (an agents productivity or her productivity minus
a constant rent of the rm). At this wage, the agent faces an innitely elastic
labor demand, i.e. she can freely choose the number of hours worked. This
modelling of labor demand is common in the literature on female labor supply
6
(see e.g. Attanasio et al. (2008) and Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011)) and also
similar to Bonin et al. (2002) who study the e¤ects of di¤erent wage-subsidy
policies in Germany.5 In line with our assumptions on labor demand, we ob-
serve a high part-time rate for women with low hourly wages and a widespread
distribution of their hours worked in Germany (see Section 4).
We consider a minimumwage that is introduced as an e¤ective wage subsidy
(referred to as "Kombilohn" in the German political debate). Note that this
policy does not a¤ect the gross hourly wage paid by the employer (assuming
that productivity or prior wages paid can be observed by the government).
With a constant gross wage and innitely elastic labor demand, a minimum
wage which is introduced as a wage subsidy has no e¤ects on labor demand.
Our way of modelling labor demand of course implies that our analysis
lacks any demand e¤ects that might occur even though the policy does not
alter the hourly wage paid by the employer. Those e¤ects might occur when
it is not possible for individuals to freely increase hours worked at a constant
hourly gross wage rate. While reductions in employment are excluded (at the
prior employment level, employers face unchanged wage costs), employers may
however be reluctant to accomodate the increases in hours worked desired by
the supply side.
Based on the existing literature on demand e¤ects of minimum wages, we
are however condent that these quantity e¤ects at constant labor costs are
relatively small. In fact, even for policies where the employer faces increasing
wage costs after the introduction of a minimum wage, empirical studies usually
document rather small e¤ects on employment.6 For instance, studies on the
national minimum wage in the UK have documented little or no evidence of
any employment e¤ects (see e.g. Stewart (2004) and Dolton et al. (2010) and
Metcalf (2008) for a survey). Similarly, for the US, the results are ambiguous
but the majority of studies nd small negative employment e¤ects (Neumark
and Wascher 2007; Dube et al. 2010). The e¤ect of minimum wages on la-
bor demand seems to depend on the level of the minimum wage. König and
Möller (2009) have analyzed the de-facto introduction of a minimum wage in
the German construction industry. While it had no employment e¤ects in West
Germany, the e¤ects were negative in the East where the same minimum wage
corresponded to a substantially stronger rise in wages.7 Some studies have
5In fact, female hours worked are often argued to be determined by supply-side consider-
ations and hence analyzed in pure labor-supply models (Attanasio et al. 2008; Eckstein and
Lifshitz 2011).
6Theoretically, the e¤ects are ambiguous. As for minimum wages to be paid completely
by the employer, the classical view suggests negative e¤ects on labor demand while more
recent models suggest that even increases in labor demand are possible when employers have
su¢ ciently high monopsony power (Krueger and Card 1995; Dickens et al. 1999).
7Bauer et al. (2009) and Knabe and Schöb (2009) rely on estimated models of labor
demand and report negative employment e¤ects. Boockmann et al. (2012) and Frings
(2012) nd no evidence for negative employment e¤ects of minimum wages in Germany.
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evaluated the employment e¤ects of minimum wages particularly for women.
For instance, Addison and Ozturk (2011) report only small or marginally sig-
nicant e¤ects when controlling for country-xed e¤ects. The meta-analysis of
Boockmann (2010) shows that negative employment e¤ects are found less fre-
quently for women than for other population groups. In sum, this evidence for
small employment e¤ects even when minimum wages are to be paid solely by
the employer makes us condent that minimum wage subsidies as investigated
in our analysis (leaving labor costs for the employer unchanged) are unlikely
to have substantial demand e¤ects.
3 Theoretical analysis
In this section, we solve for householdsdecisions in closed form and aggregate
them analytically. The aggregation allows us to compare the labor-supply
responses of di¤erent subgroups in the population. Specically, we compare
the average change in labor supply between single women and married women
in reaction to the introduction of the minimum wage.
To do so analytically, we apply a number of simplifying parameter restric-
tions in this section that are relaxed for the quantitative analysis in Section 4.
First, we assume that also the market good is completely public to a house-
hold, i.e.  = 0 implying ci = cj. This assumption allows us to abstract from
household bargaining in the analytical solution of the model. For utility, we
apply the restrictions 1 = 1=, 2 !1, 3 !1 and  = 11  which results
in additively separable preferences of the form
ui =
c1 j
1   +  i  dj,
where  =  @ ln

@ui
@dj
=@ui
@cj

=@ ln (cj=dj) is the elasticity of substitution between
the two commodities. We further use  = 1 = 2 = 0; implying homogeneous
preferences across the population, see (2). Finally, we restrict home technology
by h !1, i = 1 leading to linear technology with equal home productivity
across agents, dj =
P
i2j hi. The time endowment is normalized to 1.
We also assume an analytically tractable wage distribution in this section.
To illustrate the behavior of women with hourly wages below a potential min-
imum wage, we consider a group of women with initial net wages lower than
this potential minimum wage, denoted by wmin. In this section, we focus on
the behavior of recipients of a minimum wage and do not evaluate the behavior
of those agents who nance the policy.
For the analytical model solution, we normalize the mass of single women
who are potential minimum-wage recipients to 1 and assume that their prior net
wages are distributed uniformly on (0; wmin). We apply the same assumptions
for married female recipients whose labor supply also depends on the wages
of their husbands. In this section, we restrict their husbands net wage distri-
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bution to be uniform on (wmin; w) and assume that mating occurs randomly.
In the quantitative analysis in Section 4, we use the actually observed wages
(for couples, the observed husband-wife wage pairs), numbers of children and
individualsages from household micro data and estimate the parameters of
the full model. There, we also evaluate the costs of the minimum wage policies
to the public budget and the reaction of those agents who have to bear these
costs.
3.1 Single women
3.1.1 Individual decisions
In this group, each household consists of one member. The decisive character-
istic of an agent is her net wage rate wi which di¤ers across agents. The single
household maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraints in terms of
both goods, (3) and (5), which read as di = hi and ci = wi  ni   ti, and the
time constraint (4) with T = 1.
The rst-order conditions to this problem give the following condition on
labor supply,
@ui
@di
=
@ui
@ci
= wi,
that is, the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods equals the
agents net wage. With the utility function (1) and the parameter restrictions
introduced above, we have @u
@ci
= ci
  and @ui
di
=  . Combining terms, we
obtain
ni (wi) =  
 1=  w
 1

i (7)
as the labor supply function of singles.
3.1.2 Aggregation
We now aggregate the individual labor supply decisions (7) to total hours
worked of female singles with initial hourly net wages below a potential min-
imum wage. This group has mass 1 and wages are distributed uniformly on
(0; wmin). Aggregate hours of this group are given by
nf =
Z wmin
0
ni (wi)
1
wmin
dwi,
where 1
wmin
is the density of net wages in (0; wmin). Solving the integral gives
nf =  
 1= 
2   1 (wmin)
 1
 ;
where nf denotes average hours worked of single women with net wages below
the minimum wage before its introduction.
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3.1.3 Comparative static analysis of the minimum wage
We now consider the e¤ect of introducing a minimumwage wmin on labor supply
of female single recipients. When the policy is implemented, all recipients in
this group e¤ectively earn a net wage of wmin. As a consequence, their total
labor supply is
R wmin
0
ni (wmin)
1
wmin
dwi which evaluates as
n
m:w:
f =  
 1=  w
 1

min ;
where n
m:w:
f denotes average hours worked by single women a¤ected by the min-
imum wage after its introduction. Thus, the policy induces a relative change
in labor supply of
nf
nf
=
n
m:w:
f   nf
nf
=
   1

. (8)
The relative labor supply reaction to the introduction of the minimum wage
is governed solely by the parameter  measuring the elasticity of substitution
between home and market goods. This mirrors the fact that the only way in
which a single household can react to a wage increase is substitution between
home and market consumption.
Also note that the e¤ect of the minimum wage in the bachelorettes group
is relatively small if agentsutility does not deviate too much from log util-
ity. For  ! 1, which is equivalent to log utility from market consumption,
the introduction of the minimum wage has no e¤ect on labor supply of the
considered group of women.
3.2 Couples
3.2.1 Decisions at the couple level
We now consider married women with hourly wages below a potential minimum
wage. These women are married to men who di¤er by wages themselves. A
couple j consists of two spouses, a wife F and a husband M with net wages
wF and wM .
In collective models of household behavior, households allocate their re-
sources e¢ ciently (Chiappori 1988; Chiappori 1992). As both goods are as-
sumed to be public to a household in this section, utility is the same for both
spouses. Producing home goods e¢ ciently, the household distinguishes between
the two spouses by means of their wages. As the two spousestime inputs are
perfect substitutes in home production for h ! 1, see (3), the time of the
spouse with the lower opportunity costs of time (i.e. the lower market wage)
is used rst in home production. To facilitate the exposition, we will use the
indices i = 1; 2 to identify primary and secondary earner, respectively.
The e¢ cient household maximizes utility subject to (5) and (3), which read
as cj = w1n1 + w2n2   tj and dj = h1 + h2, together with the two spouses
time constraints (4). Combining the four constraints of the married couple and
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using that the couple uses the secondary earners time rst in home production
gives
cj =

w1 + (1  d)  w2   tj, dj < 1
(2  d)  w1   tj, dj  1. (9)
The rst-order conditions to the couples problem yield
  cj =

w2, dj < 1
w1, dj  1. (10)
Combining equations (9) and (10) gives the e¢ cient level of home consumption
for couple j,
dj =
(
1    1=  w(1 )=2 + w1w2 ; w1    1=  w
1=
2
2    1=  w(1 )=1 , w1 >   1=  w1=2 .
(11)
In the rst case of (11), home production is carried out solely by the secondary
earner, n2 = dj; who spends the remaining time on market work, n2 = 1 dj =
  1= w1=2  w1
w2
. The primary earner does not work in home production in this
case and spends the entire time endowment on paid market work, n1 = 1. In
the second case of (11), the household wishes so much home consumption that
time of both spouses is needed to produce it. Consequently, the secondary
earner has no time left for market work, h2 = 1 and n2 = 0; and the primary
earner works at home and at the market, h1 = dj   1 and n1 = 1   h1 =
  1=  w(1 )=1 .
Taken together, market hours of the wife evaluate as8
nF (wF ; wM) =

0, wF <  wM
  1= (wF )
( 1)=   wM
wF
, wF   wM .
(12)
The labor-supply function of a married woman (12) reects that the couple has
two margins of substitution. First, as the single household, it can substitute
between the two consumption commodities. Second, the couple household can
substitute between the two spousestime in home production - a margin which
the single household does not have.
3.2.2 Aggregation
We now consider total labor supplied by married women earning wages be-
low the minimum wage before its introduction.9 As labor supply of a married
woman depends on her own wage as well as on her husbands wage, see (12), we
8In the analytical analysis we assume that the wife is always the secondary earner. This
is relaxed in the full version of the model that is solved numerically in Section 4 where we
use the empirically observed husband-wife wage pairs.
9The results in this and the following section are derived in more detail in the Appendix.
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also need to take into account to whom the considered women are married. As-
suming random mating, total working hours of the considered group of married
women are given by nF =
R R
nF (wF ; wM) gM (wM) dwMgF (wF ) dwF , where
gF (wF ) and gM (wM) denote the density functions of the considered married
womens wages and their husbandsones, respectively.10
We rst determine average hours worked by married women who earn
a specic wage wF , that is we aggregate over their husbands wages,R
nF (wF ; wM) gM (wM) dwM . The aggregation gives
nF (wF ) =
8>><>>:
0 ; wF <  w

min
1
w wmin 
0@  2=wF   12  2=  w(2 )=F   1=wmin  w( 1)=F
+1
2
w2min  w 1F
1A ; wF   wmin (13)
Using this, we can compute average hours of married women with wages
below the minimum wage before its introduction:
nF =
Z Z
nF (wF ; wM) gM (wM) dwMgF (wF ) dwF
=
1
(w   wmin)
0BBB@
 
1
2
  2= + 
4
  1
2
ln 

wmin
+ 
2

( 1) 1
2(2 1)  w2 1min
 
4
  2=w(2 )=min   2 1  1=w(2 1)=min
 1
2
(   1)wmin  lnwmin
1CCCA . (14)
3.2.3 Comparative static analysis of the minimum wage
We now consider the e¤ects of introducing a minimum wage wmin on labor
supply of married women a¤ected by this policy. Due to our assumptions
on the wage distributions in this section, wages of the husbands of low-wage
women are not a¤ected by this policy.
Average labor supply after the introduction of the minimum wage can be
determined by evaluating (13) at wmin:
nm:w:F =
1
w   wmin
" 
  2= + 1
2

wmin   12  2=  w(2 )=min
   1=w(2 1)=min
#
(15)
where nm:w:F denotes average hours worked by married women a¤ected by the
minimum wage after its introduction.
In order to obtain a simple expression for nF=nF , we normalize wmin to
1. This normalization does not a¤ect the interpretation of  but that of  .
Market consumption is now expressed in units of the minimum wage. This
10In the quantitative analysis in Section 4, we relax the random-mating assumption and
use the actually observed husband-wife wage pairs.
12
implies that, for at least some women with wages not above the minimum
wage supplying positive hours to the market,  needs to be less than 1, see
(13) where the participation threshold becomes wF   .
Applying the normalization, average hours worked of the considered mar-
ried women with and without a minimum wage, respectively, simplify to
nF =
  2=
2 (w   1)

1  2
2   1 
1= +

2
  ln 

 2=   
2
+
1
(2   1) 
2

(16)
and
nm:w:F =
  2=
2 (w   1)
 
 1=   12 . (17)
Comparing nF and nm:w:F in equations (16) and (17), respectively, we can
summarize the main results of the theoretical analysis of married womens
behavior in two propositions:
Proposition 1 The e¤ect of the minimum wage on married womens labor
supply is positive for all feasible parameter combinations,
nm:w:F > nF :
(Proof: See Appendix A.2)
Proposition 1 states that, in contrast to the results obtained for single
women, the e¤ect of the minimum wage on the labor supply of married women
is always positive. That is, even when the introduction of the minimum wage
induces households to substitute towards home consumption ( < 1) the sub-
stitution away from female time in home production dominates.
Proposition 2 The e¤ect of the minimum wage on married womens labor
supply exceeds that on single womens labor supply for all feasible parameter
combinations,
nm:w:F   nF
nF
>
   1

.
(Proof: See Appendix A.3)
Proposition 2 states that, even when the e¤ect of the minimum wage on
single womens labor supply is positive ( > 1), the e¤ect on married women is
even stronger. This is a consequence of the couple having a second margin of
substitution (within home production) the e¤ects of which enforce the e¤ects
of the substitution between the two commodities.
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4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we relax the parameter restrictions imposed in Section 3 and
evaluate the model quantitatively. We rst estimate the parameters of the
model using micro data for Germany and illustrate that the estimated model
ts well the empirical observed distribution of hours worked by population sub-
groups. We then use the estimated model to perform policy experiments with
respect to the introduction of a minimum wage subsidy. Thereby, we distin-
guish between di¤erent levels and designs of the minimum wage and between
di¤erent ways of nancing it.
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We use micro data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) for the year
2009 (wave 2010). We compute hourly wages as monthly labor earnings divided
by monthly hours worked. The SOEP reports both gross and net wage income,
which we use to calculate net and gross hourly wages. To compare wages to
the minimum-wage levels discussed in the current political debate, we express
wages in 2011 e.
Next to wages, we use information on gender, number of children currently
living in the household, age, and marital status from the SOEP. We restrict
the sample to main working age dened as 25 to 55 and to individuals with
positive hours worked. The latter restriction mirrors our focus on labor demand
at the intensive margin of the initially employed and circumvents problems
of involuntary (i.e. demand-driven) unemployment which is absent from our
analysis. Our assumptions on labor demand (see Section 2) thus break down
to the assumption that hours worked of the employed at the intensive margin
are supply-side determined.
We exclude the self-employed as they would reasonably not be a¤ected by
minimum-wage policies. We further restrict the sample to individuals who are
either married with spouse present or not married and living alone. This allows
us a clear distinction between singles and couples in our sample and circum-
vents problems of cohabitation. Our sample of married individuals consists of
husband-wife pairs which are matched by the household identication num-
ber. In the model, we allow agents to allocate a weekly time endowment of 50
hours to market work and home production. In the data, we therefore drop
individuals who work more than 50 hours per week but keep their information
as determinants of their spouseslabor supply.
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of our sample. We report sum-
mary statistics for di¤erent population subgroups, distinguishing by gender
and marital status. In the policy experiments we perform below, we consider
di¤erent levels of the minimum wage. Under the most generous policy the min-
imum wage will be set to e 8.50 net per hour. In Table 1, we therefore report
the summary statistics also for potential receivers of the minimum wage, i.e.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
no. gross net wage number years weekly stdev. part
obs. wage own spouse children of age hours hours time
total sample 4672 16.60 10.95 0.69 42.35 34.41 12.91 0.24
married men 1508 19.83 13.21 9.57 0.87 44.04 41.31 7.45 0.05
married women 1713 14.55 9.57 13.11 0.88 41.91 27.61 13.48 0.44
single men 611 16.64 10.70 0.09 40.36 38.73 10.82 0.11
single women 840 14.93 9.92 0.42 41.70 32.74 13.27 0.26
net wages  e 8.50 1717 9.46 6.28 0.65 41.27 31.22 14.08 0.33
married men 341 10.21 6.59 8.44 0.71 42.99 39.89 10.49 0.11
married women 827 9.35 6.24 11.74 0.85 41.77 26.76 13.22 0.47
single men 198 9.20 6.08 0.07 38.35 36.73 13.47 0.15
single women 351 9.13 6.18 0.45 40.07 30.18 14.56 0.33
Notes: Part time dened as weekly hours between 0 and 28.
for those individuals reporting a lower net hourly wage than e 8.50.11
A rst important aspect from Table 1 is the gender composition of the low-
wage sector. While the total sample is almost evenly divided in women and
men, about two thirds of the individuals in the low-wage sector are women.
Again about two thirds of these women are married.
The table further shows group means of several variables that impact on
labor supply in our model: wages (own and partners), the number of children,
and years of age. There is a gender wage gap with womens wages averaging
only about 78% of those of men. In couples, we observe positive assortative
mating in terms of wages, as individuals with low wages tend to be married to
partners with below-average wages themselves. Children are positively corre-
lated to wages with the exception of single mothers. There are no substantial
age di¤erences between groups. The column printed in bold displays average
hours worked of the di¤erent population subgroups. One can see that women
supply substantially less labor to the market. They also have higher variations
in labor supply and much higher part-time rates. These observations provide
support for the view that labor supply considerations are important especially
for female hours at the intensive margin. In line with this, we also observe that
the correlation between hours and wages is substantially higher for women than
for men.
4.2 Estimation and model t
We estimate the structural model by non-linear least squares using the micro
data. Formally, let nempi be the empirically observed weekly hours worked
of individual i and denote by nmod (,i) the model-predicted hours worked
for individual i as a function of the model parameters collected in  and
11Summary statistics are similar for lower levels of the potential minimum wage.
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the individuals observable characteristics (gender, marital status, net wage,
number of children, age, and - if married - the same characteristics for the
spouse) collected in i; and the net wage . The vector of point estimates, ;
satises12
 = min

X
i
 
nmod (,i)  nempi
2
:
We estimate a subset of the model parameters and x others which are dif-
cult to estimate within our set-up. We assume a time endowment of T = 50
hours per week and individual to be allocated to market work and home produc-
tion. We restrict preferences to the standard constant elasticity of substitution
type, 1 = 2 = 3 = : Since the SOEP does not provide information on
individual spousesconsumption within couples, we set the private-good com-
ponent of market consumption to  = 1:13 For simplicity, we set h ! 1 which
results in Cobb-Douglas technology for couples, dj = c  h1 M  hF ; where
c = M  F is couples total factor productivity in home production and
 = F= (M + F ) is the female production elasticity. Note that h ! 1 does
not impact on singleshome production technology which is linear. Since we
cannot observe individualsproductivities in home production, i; we assume
that home productivities di¤er only at the level of population groups. Speci-
cally, we estimate home productivity levels for couples, male singles and female
singles, denoted by c, m, and f , respectively. In summary, the vector of
parameters to be estimated is  = f;  0; ; 1; 2; ; c; m; fg :
The estimated parameter values are reported in Table 2. In general, the
estimation results are well in line with previous ndings of the literature. For
instance, the estimated elasticity of substitution between market and home
consumption, , is about 1.5. For married couples, Rupert et al. (1995) report
substitution elasticities ranging from 1.57 to 4. McGrattan et al. (1993) nd
a similar elasticity of 1.62.
The valuation of home consumption is a function of the number of children
and of age. Our estimation results lead to an average valuation of home con-
sumption in our sample of 1.3 which is well in the parameter range used by Perli
(1998). Concerning the e¤ects of children, our estimation results imply that a
child increases the valuation for home consumption of the average individual
by about one third, close to the average estimate in van Klaveren et al. (2008).
Further, the age pattern of the home valuation is convex (2 > 0). This is
similar to Bonin et al. (2002), who allow for age and age squared a¤ecting
the preference for non-market time and nd evidence for a signicantly convex
age pattern in this preference. In turn, this implies a concave pattern of labor
supply over the life cycle which is well known empirically (see e.g. Attanasio
et al. 2008).
12Standard errors are obtained using the bootstrap.
13We found that the estimation results are hardly a¤ected by the value for :
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Table 2: Parameter values.
point standard
parameter interpretation estimate error
 elasticity of substitution between c and d 1.493 (0.069)
 0 unconditional valuation of home cons. 0.998 (0.162)
 e¤ect of children on val. of home cons. 0.329 (0.056)
1 age e¤ect valuation of home consumption -0.284 (0.096)
2 age2 e¤ect valuation of home consumption 2.272 (0.494)
 female home production elasticity 0.654 (0.014)
c couplesTFP in home production 0.353 (0.161)
m male singleshome productivity 0.502 (0.223)
f female singleshome productivity 1.355 (0.498)
Notes: Age scaled to bi =(years of age - 40)/40.
The estimated female elasticity in home production is about 0.65. This
estimate is well in line with observed relative average home hours within cou-
ples. In the German time-use survey of 2002, married womens time in home
production is about twice that of their husbands.14 In our sample, the average
wife-husband wage ratio is about 75%, see Table 1. This implies that the ratio
of female to total opportunity costs of home production, which is equal to ,
is about 0.6. The estimated levels of the productivity parameters c, m, and
f depend e.g. on the scaling of nominal wage rates. The estimation results
plausibly imply that single women are more productive in home production
than male singles.
To illustrate the t of the model, we use the model to predict individual
labor-supply decisions and then calculate average hours worked for di¤erent
population groups, as we did in Table 1 using the SOEP data. Table 3 shows
mean hours worked for the total sample and for the population subgroups both
in the SOEP data and as predicted by the model. The estimated model shows
a good t to the empirical distribution of hours worked. The model matches
well the ordering of hours worked by group and also the absolute levels of
average working hours. From the lower part of Table 3 one can see that the
model matches particularly closely the mean hours worked by individuals in the
low-wage sector. This is important as, in the policy experiments we consider
below, we focus on the labor-supply decisions of individuals who are potentially
a¤ected by the minimum-wage policy. The summary statistics of hours worked
for individuals in this low-wage sector show that, for no group, the deviation
from the empirical counterpart is larger than one hour. The average deviation
is only 40 minutes.
14This refers to parents aged 30-44, see the time budget evaluation of the German Federal
Statistical O¢ ce.
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Table 3: Average hours worked in total sample and in population subgroups,
SOEP vs. model.
SOEP baseline di¤erence
data model model-data
total sample 34.41 35.74 1.33
married men 41.31 42.55 1.24
married women 27.61 30.36 2.75
single men 38.73 38.79 0.06
single women 32.74 32.26 -0.48
net wages  e 8.50 31.22 30.54 -0.67
married men 39.89 39.72 -0.17
married women 26.76 25.84 -0.93
single men 36.73 36.23 -0.50
single women 30.18 29.51 -0.67
4.3 Policy experiments
Since the estimated model is successful in replicating the average hours worked
of the di¤erent population subgroups, we use it to analyze the e¤ects of intro-
ducing subsidized minimum wages. As in the theoretical model, we implement
the minimim wage as a wage subsidy, i.e. the government adds on the cur-
rent hourly wage and pays the di¤erence to the minimum wage (modelled as
negative tax rates, i < 0, for the recipients). We run a total of eight policy
experiments which di¤er in the level of the minimum wage, its tax implications,
and in the way the wage subsidy is nanced.
We distinguish between two di¤erent ways of nancing the wage subsidy.
Under the rst strategy, the wage subsidy is nanced in a lump-sum way not
a¤ecting the net hourly wage of any individual other than the minimum-wage
recipients. Under the second nancing strategy, the government nances the
wage subsidy through additional labor income taxation. We model the tax
increase proportionally, i.e. every agent with an hourly wage above the mini-
mum wage su¤ers the same percentage reduction in net hourly wages.15 Labor
income taxation is increased so that the additional revenues exactly cover the
costs of the wage subsidy to the governments budget (details on how this is
calculated are provided below).
We also consider four di¤erent scenarios concerning the level of the mini-
mum wage and its tax implications. We consider minimum wages in the range
of e 7.50 to e 9.50 per hour, which is the range suggested in the current po-
litical debate.16 In the model, it is the net hourly wage that is decisive for the
15This implies that some agents with prior net hourly wages above the minimum wage
fall below it due to the additional taxation of labor income. These agents then become
minimum-wage receivers.
16Also other European countries such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands have min-
imum wages which lie about e 9.00 gross per hour.
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labor-supply decision. We therefore convert the discussed gross levels for the
minimum wage into the resulting net wages.
In four baseline experiments, we consider net minimum hourly wages of e
6.00 (lump-sum nanced in experiment I and tax-nanced in experiment II)
and e 7.25 (experiments III and IV) which correspond to about e 7.50 and
e 9.50 gross, respectively.17 In further experiments, we take an extreme view
and interpret the minimum-wage level discussed in the political debate as a net
wage. Specically, we consider a medium minimum wage of e 8.50 as a net
wage, for which the gross minimum wage would have to be about e 11.85 (ex-
periments V and VI). Experiments V and VI are meant to illustrate the e¤ects
of a very generous minimum wage. In two nal experiments, we take into ac-
count particularities of the German tax system which includes wide di¤erences
in e¤ective tax rates not only by income, but also by marital status and parent-
hood. In particular married women can have relatively high e¤ective marginal
tax rates. To capture this, we consider a gross hourly minimum wage of e 9.50
without compensation for di¤erences in marginal tax rates in experiments VII
and VIII. Specically, single individuals with children (belonging to tax class
2) enjoy a net minimum wage of e 7.28 per hour but married individuals whose
spouses do not belong to the group of recipients (tax class 5) only receive e
6.03 net per hour. For all other individuals, the e¤ective net hourly minimum
wage is set to e 7.12 (tax classes 1 and 4).18
An advantage of our structural approach is that we can also quantify the
costs of the policy and the associated disincentive e¤ects on those who have to
pay for it. To investigate these equilibrium relations, we evaluate labor-supply
reactions also of those individuals who do not receive the minimum wage. We
further evaluate the costs of the policy to the governments budget, the ad-
ditional gross income generated through the increases in hours worked, and
the reduction in net hourly wages necessary to tax-nance the wage subsidies.
These measures are calculated as follows. Let 
 (wmin) denote the set of re-
ceivers of a minimum wage wmin, ewi be the individuals pre-policy net wage and
N be the number of individuals in the sample. The per-capita costs of the wage
subsidy to the public budget evaluate as 1
N
P
i2
(wmin) (wmin   ewi)  ni (wmin).
The additional income is given by 1
N
P
ai  (ni (wmin)  ni ( ewi)) and captures
both, gross income increases of recipients and decreases in gross incomes of
non-recipients. The required increase in labor income taxation   (wmin) solvesP
i62
(wmin) 
 (wmin)  ewi  ni (wi) =Pi2
(wmin) (wmin   ewi)  ni (wmin).
17For details on taxation of low labor income in Germany, see Appendix B.
18Tax class 3 is irrelevant for our analysis as it applies to married individuals with relatively
high incomes, i.e. not to receivers of the minimum wage.
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4.4 Results of policy experiments
Table 4 summarizes the results of the policy experiments. Columns I through
VIII refer to experiments I-VIII discussed above. The rst row shows the
percentage change in average hours for the total sample. The next four rows
refer to the population groups formed by gender and marital status. The second
block in Table 4 shows the corresponding results for individuals who are a¤ected
by the minimum wage, again separately for all receivers and disaggregated by
gender and marital status. The third block refers to individuals who do not
receive the minimum wage. The nal block of the table reports the costs of the
policy to the governments budget, the additional gross income, the required
change in labor-income taxation, and the closure of the average gender gap in
net wages (percentage points) as an additional statistic.
E¤ects of a e 6.00 net minimum wage. The rst two columns in Table
4 show the results of introducing a wage subsidy that generates an e¤ective
minimum wage of e 6.00 net per hour corresponding to about e 7.50 gross.
This policy has only a small e¤ect on total labor supply, as average hours
worked of all individuals in the sample are predicted to increase by not more
than 1.51%. The relatively small response of total labor supply is in line with
the ndings of Bonin et al. (2002), who analyze di¤erent wage subsidies.
However, as demonstrated analytically in Section 3, labor-supply e¤ects
di¤er substantially between population groups. Married women show the
strongest reaction to the minimum wage and increase hours by 3.5% on av-
erage (including recipients and non-recipients of the minimum wage). Average
hours of single women increase by 1.5% and those of the two male groups only
by less than one percent.
Among recipients of the minimum wage, reactions are more pronounced.
Married women with prior net wages below the minimum wage increase their
labor supply by almost 30%. To put this number into perspective, we compute
the implicit labor-supply elasticity as the ratio of the relative change in hours
worked to the relative change in net wages. In this experiment, the minimum
wage increases the net wages of married women who receive the minimum wage
by slightly more than 30%, implying a labor-supply elasticity of 0.94.
Single female recipients of the minimum wage increase labor supply by
about 13%, implying a labor-supply elasticity of 0.25. For the two subgroups
of male recipients, the increase in labor supply is about 7% and the elasticities
are 0.3 for married men and 0.15 for single men.
We nd that individuals working part-time play an important role for the
predicted changes in hours worked. Specically, 85% of the individuals who
are predicted to increase hours by more than 10% work 28 hours per week or
less before the introduction of the minimum wage. In total, predicted changes
in hours of part-time workers are responsible for 89% of the predicted increases
in hours worked. Again, this supports our view that decisions at the intensive
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margin are important when studying the labor-supply responses to minimum
wages. This margin is particularly important for women (compare to Table 1).
When we look at the labor supply reactions of individuals not receiving
the minimum wage, we nd that single non-recipients do not react to a lump-
sum nanced minimum wage subsidy. However, married non-recipients slightly
decrease working hours on average which reects that these individuals tend
to work more in home production after the introduction of the minimum wage
due to the increased net wages of some of their spouses.
From the bottom of Table 4 one can see that a lump-sum nanced wage
subsidy generating an e¤ective minimum wage of e 6.00 per hour is predicted
to burden the governments budget by e 5.98 per individual and week (which
is one period in our analysis). Note that the burden to the public budget is
not a resource cost but pure redistribution. By contrast, the changes in hours
worked induce some actual change in total gross income. However, quantitatively
this e¤ect is small. With a lump-sum nanced minimum wage of e 6.00 net,
this additional income amounts to onlye 1.46 per individual of the total sample
and week. In relative terms, average income increases by 0.35% compared to
the 1.5% increase in total hours. The relatively small increase in income is
due to the fact that the minimum wage induces increases in labor supply by
individuals with below-average gross incomes. The last row of the table shows
that the introduction of the minimum wage leads to a slight closure of the net
gender wage gap as the majority of its recipients are women.
Tax nancing. The second column in Table 4 refers to the experiment where
the subsidy for the same minimum wage level is nanced using labor income
taxes. Compared to the lump-sum nanced subsidy, there are three additional
e¤ects. First, the increased taxation of labor income has negative incentive
e¤ects on those who bear the tax. But the tax nancing also a¤ects the labor
supply of recipients of the minimum wage (who are not taxed) via two e¤ects.
The rst one is compositional with more agents falling into the group of re-
cipients as some persons who have earned slightly more than the minimum
wage now become minimum-wage recipients due to increased taxation of their
prior earnings. The second e¤ect stems from the collective decision making of
couples. Agents whose spouseswages are a¤ected by the increased taxation
also react with changes in labor supply. The latter e¤ect shows the importance
of marriage patterns for the distribution of labor supply.
Compared to the e¤ects of the wage subsidy itself, the e¤ects of its tax
nancing are predicted to be rather weak. Considering total average hours, only
ten percent (1.36% compared to 1.51%) of the increase due to the introduction
of the minimum wage is crowded out by the increase in tax rates. This result
shows that subsidizing wages at the low end of the distribution by taxing
higher-wage individuals increases total labor supply. The disincentive e¤ects
for medium and high wage groups are weaker than the positive incentive e¤ects
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at the low end of the distribution, in line with the nding of higher labor-supply
elasticities for low-skill individuals (Keane and Wolpin 2010). In the di¤erent
population subgroups formed by gender and marital status, e¤ects are very
similar between lump-sum and tax nancing. As a reaction to increased labor-
income taxation, individuals not receiving the minimum wage now all decrease
their hours worked independent of marital status.
Also the costs of the policy to the public budget and the additional income
generated are very similar across ways of nancing the wage subsidy. In order
to nance a wage subsidy generating an e¤ective minimum wage of e 6.00 net
per hour, the government would have to tax away 1.5% of prior net wages.19
E¤ects of higher minimum wages. Columns III-VI of Table 4 summarize
the results for higher levels of the minimum wage. It is apparent that the
labor-supply e¤ect of the minimum wage level out as the minimum wage is
increased. Increasing the hourly net minimum wage by e 1.25 (from e 6.00
to e 7.25 or from e 7.25 to e 8.50) increases total labor supply by about one
percentage point. Even for the highest minimum wage considered (e 8.50 net),
total labor supply increases by no more than 3.55%.
The source for the levelling-out is that the labor-supply reaction to wage
increases shrinks when moving up the initial wage distribution, in line with the
ndings of Keane and Wolpin (2010). When the minimum wage is increased,
the additional recipients have lower labor-supply elasticities compared to those
who would receive also the lower minimum wage. This results in a dilution of
the strong e¤ect on those agents with very low prior wages and the average
e¤ect on recipients decreases when the minimum wage is increased.
In sharp contrast to the levelling-out in labor-supply e¤ects and additional
income, the costs of the minimum wage subsidy increase strongly when the
minimum wage is increased. Raising the minimum wage from e 6.00 to e 7.25
increases the required reduction in net wages of non-recipients by more than
2 percentage points while another e 1.25 increase (to e 8.00) would require
almost another 5 percentage points of prior net wages being taxed away. Note
that even these substantial increases in labor income taxation for individuals
above the minimum wage lead to only moderate reductions in labor supply of
these groups.20 This again conrms the presence of a low overall labor-supply
19With an average tax and contribution rate of about one third (see Table 1), this corre-
sponds to an increase in the average tax and contribution rate of about 1%.
20The positive or barely negative reaction of some groups of non-recipients in experiments
VI and VIII is due to compositional changes in the respective groups. For example, the
positive reaction of married female non-recipients in experiment VIII is caused by su¢ ciently
many women with few hours moving into the group of recipients (due to the rise in taxation)
to increase average hours of non-recipients. For similiar reasons, in experiments VI and
VIII, the composition of the group of non-recipients changes su¢ ciently for average hours of
non-recipients to change only barely despite most or all subgroups showing more substantial
reductions.
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elasticity in line with previous evidence.
There are two reasons for the strong rise in the costs of the minimum
wage subsidy. One the one hand, recipients need to be paid a higher subsidy
per working hour. On the other hand, the wage subsidy does apply to more
individuals. The combination of these two e¤ects makes the costs of the subsidy
convex in the level of the minimum wage. By contrast, its labor-supply e¤ects
level out.
Yet, the e¤ect on the closure of the gender wage gap does not level out.
With the majority of recipients being women, the subsidized minimum wage
is a redistribution of wage income from men to women. In our experiments we
nd that the most pronounced closure of the gender wage gap induced by the
minimum wage amounts to 6.5 percentage points. Also Blau and Kahn (2003)
nd that minimum wages close the gender wage gap considerably.
Di¤erent marginal tax rates. The nal two columns in Table 4 present the
results of the policy experiments where we assign the same gross minimumwage
to every recipient without compensating for di¤erent marginal tax rates. Due to
the German tax system, this leaves many married women with a substantially
lower net minimum wage while single parents receive an above-average net
minimum wage. For these experiments, we choose the medium level of e 9.50
gross per hour as the minimum wage.
The results of these experiments show that, not compensating for di¤erences
in marginal tax rates, a e 9.50 gross minimum wage has very similar e¤ects as
a combination of the e 7.50 (experiments I and II) and e 9.50 gross minimum
wages (experiments III and IV) when compensating. All groups of recipients
except married women show very similar responses as in the experiment with
the compensated e 7.25 net minimum wage. Married women who receive
the minimum wage show changes in labor supply which are relatively small
compared to the other policy experiments. This reects that relatively many
married women fall below the relatively high gross minimum wage but then
receive a relatively low net minimum wage.
5 Conclusion
The academic discussion on minimum wages mostly focusses on labor demand
as labor supply is often thought to be relatively inelastic at full time which is
supported empirically for men. But, in Germany, predominantly women would
be a¤ected by the introduction of a general minimum wage. Women are known
to have much higher labor-supply elasticities and part-time rates.
We have presented a structural model of labor supply distinguishing by
gender and marital status. We have shown analytically that, in this model,
minimum wages induce a relatively strong and unambiguously positive labor-
supply reaction of married women. By contrast, the e¤ect on single women is
clearly weaker and ambiguous in direction.
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In a quantitative analysis of the model for Germany, we have studied the
introduction of a minimum wage as a wage subsidy. We found that overall labor
supply barely changes in reaction to this policy. By contrast, some population
subgroups show strong increases in labor supply. Most importantly, married
women who receive the minimum wage are predicted to react with increases
of up to 28%. We have also found that the costs of a minimum wage subsidy
increase sharply in the level of the minimum wage while its e¤ect on labor
supply levels out.
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Appendix
A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Aggregation of married womens hours
Derivation of (13). Average hours are positive only for women whose wages
fulll wmin <   1= (wF )
1=. A woman with a lower wage works zero market
hours even with the lowest possible wage of the husband, wmin, see (12). For
women with wages above the threshold, average hours evaluate as
1
w   wmin
Z   1=(wF )1=
wmin

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Derivation of (14). Integrating (13) over female wages gives
nF =
1
wmin
Z wmin
0
nF (wF ) g (wF ) dwF
=
1
wmin
1
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The subintegrals in this expression evaluate as
Z
wFdwF =
1
2
(wF )
2 ,Z
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Z
(wF )
 1 dwF = lnwF .
Using these antiderivatives, nF can be evaluted as
nF =
1
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which is equation (14).
Derivation of (15). When there is a minimum wage, hours worked by the
considered group of married women can be calculated by evaluating (13) at
wmin:
nm:w:F =
1
w   wmin
"
  2=wF   12  2=  (wmin)(2 )=
   1=wmin  (wmin)( 1)= + 12 (wmin)2  (wmin) 1
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" 
  2= + 1
2

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#
Applying the normalization wmin = 1, average hours worked of the consid-
ered married women receiving a minimum wage simplify to
nm:w:F =
1
w   wmin 
 2=

1
2
 2=    1= + 1
2

.
Dening x :=  1= and z = 1
w wmin 
 2=:
nm:w:F = z

1
2
x2   x+ 1
2

=
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2
z

x2   2x+ 1 = 1
2
z (x  1)2 ;
where the last expression corresponds to equation (17) in the paper.
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A.2 Proof of proposition 1
With equations (16) and (17), the di¤erence n
m:w:
F   nF is a positive constant
(1
2
1
w 1 
 2=) times
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
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2
+ ln 

 2=   2 (   1)
2   1  
1= +

2
  1
(2   1) 
2.
Thus, to proof the proposition, it is su¢ cient that G ( ; ) is positive for all
values of  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 0:5) [ (0:5;1).
On the open interval  2 (0; 1), G is continuously di¤erentiable in  and
non-negative at the bounds with lim !0G ( ; ) = 2 > 0 and G (1; ) = 0.
The rst two marginal derivatives in  direction are
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=
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2 
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
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  1
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   1

2
  2
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.
G has a local minimum at  = 1 as we have @G( ;)
@ 
j =1 = 0 and @2G( ;)@ 2 j =1
= 2
2
> 0. Together with lim !0G ( ; ) > G (1; ) = 0 and continuity, this
implies that for G ( ; )  0 for some  2 (0; 1), G needs to have two more
critical points for 0 <  < 1, so a total of three critical points. The necessary
condition @G( ;)
@ 
= 0 can be simplied to
g1 ( ; ) + g2 ( ; ) = g3 ( ) ; (18)
with g1 ( ; ) =  12 1    1=, g2 ( ; ) = 2 1   2 2=, and g3 ( ) = 1 + ln .
g1 is convex in  when  < 0:5 and when  > 1, linear when  = 1, and
concave otherwise. g2 is convex in  when 0:5 <  < 1 and when  > 2,
linear when  = 1 and when  = 2, and concave otherwise. Table 5 illustrates
that, for any feasible , condition (18) can be expressed as the intersection of
two non-convex functions in  2 (0; 1). Two non-convex functions intersect at
most twice such that (18) has at most two solutions and G has at most two
critical points. Thus, G > 08 2 (0; 1) which is equivalent to nm:w:F > nF .
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Table 5: Curvature of the subfunctions of (18) in  direction and manipulations
of (18) into intersections of non-convex functions.
g1 g2 g3 (18) ()
0 <  < 0:5 convex concave concave g2 = g3   g1
0:5 <  < 1 concave convex concave g1 = g3   g2
 = 1 linear linear concave g1 + g2 = g3
1 <  < 2 convex concave concave g2 = g3   g1
 = 2 convex linear concave g2 = g3   g1
 > 2 convex convex concave 0 = g3   g1   g2
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
With equations (16) and (17), n
m:w:
F  nF
nF
>  1

is equivalent to
H ( ; ) =   1+ 
2
( 2=   1) (2   1)  2= (2   1) ln + 2  2= < 0.
We will show that H is negative for all values of  2 (0; 1) and  > 0.
On the open interval  2 (0; 1), H is twice continuously di¤erentiable in
 and is non-positive at the bounds with H (1; ) = 0 and lim !0H ( ; ) =
3
2
   1  2 =   (   1)2   1
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A root of this derivative, @H( ;)
@ 
= 0, has to fulll
 2( 1)=    + (1  2) ln = 0, (19)
which it does for  = 1. The  derivative of the left-hand side of (19), 2(1 )
 (+2)=

 
2
    2

  1
 
, is strictly negative as either 1    (when  > 1) or  2    2
(when  < 1) is negative or both are zero (when  = 1). This implies that
(19) has only one solution and, in turn, @H( ;)
@ 
has only one root,  = 1.
Together with continuity of @H( ;)
@ 
, this ensures monotonicity of H. Together
with lim !0H ( ; ) < H (1; ) = 0 and continuity, monotonicity implies that
H is negative for all  2 (0; 1) which is equivalent to nm:w:F  nF
nF
>  1

.
B Taxation of low labor incomes in Germany
Table 6 summarizes net hourly incomes for di¤erent gross wage rates and tax
classes.21 In the political debate, a gross minimum wage is discussed in the
range of e 7.50 to e 9.50 per hour. In Germany, individuals in the low-income
21We concentrate on tax classes 1 through 5 which capture tax di¤erences by parenthood
and marital status.
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Table 6: Hourly net wage for di¤erent gross wage rates and tax classes.
hourly tax class
gross wage 1 2 3 4 5
e 7.50 e 5.84 e 5.94 e 5.94 e 5.84 e 5.12
e 8.50 e 6.49 e 6.63 e 6.73 e 6.49 e 5.60
e 9.50 e 7.12 e 7.28 e 7.53 e 7.12 e 6.03
e 11.85 e 8.42 e 8.64 e 9.40 e 8.42 e 6.95
Notes: The considered individual works 135 hours per month, has no non-labor income,
is 40 years old, not a member of church, and lives in Northrhine Westphalia. We used
www.brutto-netto-rechner.info to calculate net from gross monthly incomes.
sector who would be a¤ected by the introduction of a minimum wage mainly
pay contributions to social security and only little income taxes. Social-security
contributions are raised proportionally while income taxation is progressive. As
a consequence, di¤erences between most tax classes are not too pronounced in
the low-income sectors. The only exception is tax class 5 in which no tax
exemptions are granted and consequently net incomes are substantially lower
also for low gross incomes. Tax class 5 only applies to married individuals
whose spousesincomes are substantially higher, thus predominantly to married
women.
When setting the net minimum wages in our policy experiments in Section
4.3 we have in mind the numbers in Table 6. For a relatively low minimum wage
of e 7.50 gross per hour, the corresponding net wages in tax classes 1 through
4 are close to e 6.00. A relatively high minimum wage of e 9.50 gross per hour
corresponds to about e 7.25 net per hour. To achieve net hourly wages around
e 8.50, a gross hourly wage of about e 11.85 per hour is necessary. E¤ective
net wages are about 15 to 20% lower in tax class 5, which is relevant for the
policy experiments presented in columns VII and VIII of Table 4.
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